

Secret

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Secret

No 42

31 July 1972

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022400090001-3

Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022400090001-3

~~SECRET~~

No. 0182/72
31 July 1972

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

SOUTH VIETNAM: The Communists prepare for heavier fighting in Quang Tri. (Page 1)


LAOS: Government forces make no progress in south Laos. (Page 2)

SOUTH KOREA - UN: Uncertainty in Seoul about the Korean question in the UN. (Page 4)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022400090001-3



553394 7 72

Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022400090001-3

SECRET

SECRET

SOUTH VIETNAM: Heavy fighting continues in the northern provinces amid signs that the Communists are preparing for major new action in the Quang Tri City area.

Over the weekend, South Vietnamese Marines and paratroopers repulsed several enemy attacks, including one tank-led assault, against government positions in Quang Tri City and along the western end of the My Chanh defense line to the south. Several sharp Communist ground probes also occurred near enemy-held Fire Support Base Bastogne, where Communist tanks were sighted late last week.



Farther south, in Quang Nam Province, increasingly heavy fighting is occurring near the Que Son District capital, and the South Vietnamese have taken substantial losses. There are signs that the enemy is attempting to move closer to heavily populated coastal areas and intends to move armor and artillery into Quang Nam Province.

South Vietnamese forces in Binh Dinh Province report continued stiff Communist resistance to clearing operations in the northern part of the province. As a result, the government apparently has pulled out of the Hoai An District capital, and heavy fighting is reported to be under way in nearby Bong Son.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET



553395 7-12 CIA

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

LAOS: Government forces have made no new progress in their efforts to recapture territory lost during the dry season.

In south Laos, irregular forces have managed to consolidate their hold on Khong Sedone, but elements of the North Vietnamese 39th Regiment are still stubbornly defending the surrounding area. On the Bolovens Plateau, elements of the North Vietnamese 9th Regiment have thwarted government attempts to push east from the junction of Routes 23 and 231. During the rainy season last year, government forces attempted to retake Paksong and establish a presence on the central portion of the Plateau; they presumably will attempt to do so again this year. In both the Khong Sedone and western Bolovens areas, the Communists are striving to tie down government forces and prevent any threat to the infiltration corridor to the east.

In the north, the government's half-hearted effort to recapture the hills southwest of the Plaine des Jarres has also ground to a halt. Irregular forces attempting to move toward Phou Pha Sai, the strategic highpoint overlooking the Plaine des Jarres, have not advanced for the past several days because bad weather has limited air support. Government units that had been on the ridge just south of Phou Pha Sai returned to Pha Dong after an attack by small North Vietnamese forces. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

31 Jul 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SOUTH KOREA - UN: There is growing uncertainty in the South Korean Foreign Ministry about the chances of postponing the Korean question at the UN General Assembly session this fall.

A recent government survey indicates that earlier, favorable estimates of international support for the South Korean position were overly optimistic.

25X1 [redacted] the survey finds that many countries are now reserving their position and taking a hard look at a draft resolution sponsored by nonaligned countries that urges debate of the issue. As a result, Foreign Ministry personnel are giving more thought to alternative courses of action should deferment prove unlikely.

For the present, the government is making more intensive efforts to solidify the support it has. The leadership appears doggedly determined to stick to established policy in the belief that any discussion of contingency planning with other countries would further erode international support. Although additional slippage in support for South Korea can be anticipated in the weeks ahead, Seoul's approach is not likely to change without some major defections among its current supporters. [redacted]

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022400090001-3

Secret

Secret

Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022400090001-3